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In 2002, the Supreme Court essentially shut the door on the question of the constitutionality of capital punishment for the intellectually disabled. Daryl 
Atkins, whose intellectual capacity was equivalent to that of a nine- to twelve-
year-old, was convicted of armed robbery and murder and sentenced to death. 
Atkins’ sentence was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, but reversed by 
the United States Supreme Court in a landmark decision.1 Thus, the Court 
finally determined that the death penalty, when applied to the intellectually 
disabled, constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” banned by the Eighth 
Amendment. However, even after years of legal precedent and increasingly 
favorable public opinion, this 6-3 decision included passionate dissents and 
sparked debate among legal scholars and the public. Some questioned how 
exactly “mentally retarded” would be defined and whether the decision would 
create a new loophole that could be used to escape the death penalty. Death 
penalty abolitionists, on the other hand, applauded the decision, arguing that 
executing the intellectually disabled did not fulfill the goal of retribution or 
deterrence, the two principle justifications for capital punishment. 
This paper will explore the controversies, constitutional questions, and 
legal precedents leading up to the Atkins v. Virginia decision. It will also 
attempt to answer a few important questions regarding the issue as a whole: 
What were the most significant factors and legal precedents that led to the 
new constitutional interpretation in Atkins? On what legal grounds did the 
minority justices dissent and how strong were their arguments? How does 
the exemption of the intellectually disabled affect the institution of capital 
punishment in America? What issues have yet to be resolved? 
In order to trace the evolution and legal reasoning behind the issue of 
capital punishment for the intellectually disabled through the Supreme Court, 
it is necessary to first explore how it became a federal issue. Until the 1960s, 
American capital punishment was entirely an issue of states’ rights, leaving 
virtually every aspect from civil procedure through method of execution to 
the discretion of individual states. This individual discretion led to a very 
wide range of policies and little accountability for those states, especially in 
the South, whose policies proved to be particularly discriminatory. However, 
by the 1960s, movements to abolish the death penalty quickly began to 
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gain momentum. Since the goal of these groups was to abolish the death 
penalty nationally, its supporters felt the most effective way to do so was to 
frame the question as a federal issue, not one for individual states to decide. 
The framing of capital punishment as a federal question incorporated the 
diverse policies of many states into one entity, the constitutionality of which 
could only be decided by the United States Supreme Court.2 As a result, the 
Supreme Court decided not only the constitutionality of the institution of 
capital punishment as a whole, but also the many individual and controversial 
aspects of its application. These included rulings on exactly what types of due 
process rights are sufficient to meet the standards of the Eighth Amendment 
(Gregg v. Georgia), whether rape should be considered a capital crime (Cocker 
v. Georgia), the constitutionality of executing a person that is declared 
“insane” at the date of their execution (Ford v. Wainwright), claims of racial 
discrimination (McCleskey v. Kemp), the execution of juveniles (Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, Stanford v. Kentucky, Wilkins v. Missouri), and the execution of the 
“mentally retarded” (Penry v. Lynaugh, Atkins v. Virginia).3
To understand how the Court came to a decision in Atkins, it is important 
to study the relevant cases leading up to it, the opinions of the various 
justices, and the evolution of the constitutional interpretation, especially 
with regard to the Eighth Amendment. The first case that would directly 
affect the evolution of the Eighth Amendment’s application to the death 
penalty for the intellectually disabled was Weems v. United States. In 1910, 
Paul A. Weems was sentenced to 15 years in prison (including hard labor) 
by the Philippine courts, for the crime of falsifying a public document for 
the purpose of defrauding the government.4 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that this sentence was “cruel and unusual” in that such a severe punishment 
was excessive relative to the minor crime that was committed. Weems is 
largely credited for creating the “proportionality” principle for determining 
the constitutionality of any type of punishment. The case established the 
standard that “all punishments (including the death penalty) are excessive 
and therefore constitutionally prohibited if not ‘graduated and proportioned 
to the offence.’”5 This decision became a significant tool used by the majority 
in Atkins, who argued that the intellectually disabled were less culpable, and 
therefore, proportionally, their punishments should be less severe.
The 1958 Supreme Court decision in Trop v. Dulles was a significant next 
step in the evolution of the Eighth Amendment. The Court ruled that the 
punishment of removal of citizenship, when applied to a natural-born citizen, 
was always excessive and therefore unconstitutional because it involved “the 
total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”6 Most 
importantly, in his majority opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren established 
the precedent that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”7 
These words established the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the 
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Eighth Amendment as a living, constantly evolving principle. In other words, 
this concept validated the importance of a “national consensus” in proving, 
in Atkins, that society’s standards of decency had indeed evolved to the point 
of invalidating the death penalty for the intellectually disabled. 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the case that largely reinstated the death penalty 
after the Furman v. Georgia (1972) decision resulted in a nation wide de 
facto moratorium, also had a significant impact on the majority’s reasoning 
in Atkins twenty-two years later. In Gregg, the Court held that if criminal 
sanctions do not “measurably” contribute to retribution, deterrence, or both, 
they should be deemed “excessive” and therefore unconstitutional.8 Since it is 
difficult to argue that the execution of the intellectually disabled contributes 
to either retribution or deterrence, the majority in Atkins was later able to use 
this important decision to their advantage. 
Ford v. Wainwright (1986) was the first decision to limit the ability of 
the State to execute a person based on their mental diagnosis. During his 
years on death row, Alvin Ford developed a mental disorder that included 
“paranoid obsession on the KKK and delusions of power and control.”9 
Ford’s psychiatrist concluded that his mental disorder was “severe enough 
to substantially affect” his “present ability to assist in the defense of life.”10 
As a result, the Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the Eighth Amendment 
did not allow “the execution of an inmate who is incompetent at the time 
of execution.”11 Much of the majority’s reasoning in Ford would be closely 
echoed in the ideas expressed later in Atkins. These included assertions that 
executing the incompetent “offends humanity” and that it is “uncivilized for 
society to so avenge itself on the person… disabled by mental illness.”12 The 
majority also emphasized a lack of evidence for deterrence and retribution 
as well as the defendant’s inability to understand “the finality of the death 
penalty”13 as reasons for ruling in favor of Ford.
Eighth Amendment protection was further strengthened after the Supreme 
Court ruled that the execution of capital offenders at or below the age of 15 
was unconstitutional in Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988).14 However, despite 
this evolution of the Eighth Amendment, in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) the 
Supreme Court ruled that the execution of the “mentally retarded” did 
not violate the Constitution. In this case, Penry’s intellectual disability was 
disputed. His IQ was estimated to be between 50 and 60, he had the mental 
age of a six- to seven-year-old, had suffered brain damage from birth, was 
repeatedly beaten and abused as a child, and dropped out of school in the 
first grade.15 Although this mental retardation did diminish his “personal 
culpability for the murder,”16 during the sentencing phase of his trial the 
jury was not instructed that they could take these factors into account as 
mitigating evidence, which might have resulted in a lesser sentence. Despite 
this, the Supreme Court still voted 5-4 for keeping the death penalty in place 
for the intellectually disabled, emphasizing the fact that there was not yet 
a “national consensus” against it. However, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, did simultaneously argue that the jury should be 
allowed to consider “mental retardation” a mitigating factor during the 
sentencing phase of capital trials. 
Finally, in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted Atkins v. Virginia 
on appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court. In 1998, Daryl Atkins was 
convicted of armed robbery and murder, and consequently sentenced to 
death. Atkins had an IQ of 59, equivalent to that of a nine- to twelve-year-
old, and was classified as “mildly mentally retarded” by a forensic psychologist 
testifying on behalf of the defense. In the first case to reconsider the death 
penalty for the “mentally retarded” since Penry in 1989, the Court had to 
once again answer the question of whether executing individuals in this group 
constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment 
taking into account the “evolving standards of decency” of a 21st century 
society. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled to reverse Penry, led by Justice 
Stevens who wrote on behalf of the majority. 
Stevens wrote that the mentally handicapped could not be assigned the 
same degree of moral blame for the “most serious adult criminal conduct” 
because of their “disabilities in the areas of reasoning, judgment, and control 
of their impulses.”17 When addressing the issue of the proportionality of the 
punishment, the Court relied on statistical evidence, arguing that since Penry 
was decided, a “national consensus” had developed against the execution of 
those with intellectual disabilities. This was established by examining the 
“consistency in the direction of change” with regard to the 16 states that 
retained the death penalty but had outlawed its application to the “mentally 
retarded” since 1989.18 In an attempt to remain consistent with the Ford 
ruling, the Court left the individual states free to determine what criteria 
would be used to decide which offenders were in fact “mentally retarded.” 
In accordance with the principles of Gregg, the majority argued that the 
two justifications for capital punishment, retribution and deterrence, were 
not furthered by the execution of the intellectually disabled. The majority 
argued the mentally handicapped did not have the ability to perform a fully 
“calculated” murder worthy of execution because of their mental deficiencies. 
The Court also mentioned that the exemption of the intellectually disabled 
from execution would not have an effect on those of full mental capacity, 
who would be not qualify for the exemption. Finally, it was determined that 
the “reduced capacity” of defendants with intellectual disabilities left them 
particularly vulnerable to wrongful convictions, especially because they were 
easily coerced into giving a false confession. 
Justice Scalia, who in his opinions consistently defends the constitutionality 
of the death penalty, wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Scalia claimed that the majority’s decision 
relied upon “nothing but personal views” and was an example of what he 
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refers to as Eighth Amendment “death-is-different jurisprudence.”19 He 
argued in favor of the traditional interpretation of the exemption only for the 
severely retarded or “idiots,” which was in place in 1791. Only these “idiots,” 
he argued, displayed a clear “deficiency in will” and an inability to tell right 
from wrong significant enough to be exempt from the death penalty. Scalia 
also disputed the majority’s “national consensus” and “evolving standards of 
decency” arguments, pointing out that only 18 of the 38 states where capital 
punishment was legal (47 percent) had enacted exemptions for the mentally 
retarded.20 The decision, Scalia protested, only added to the long list of 
impediments limiting the use of the death penalty, none of which existed at 
the time of the Constitution’s ratification. Additionally, Scalia worried that 
the symptoms of mental retardation can be easily feigned and that those who 
do so “risk nothing at all.”21
Despite the controversy that surrounded it, there is no doubt that the 
Atkins decision has had significant effects on the institution of capital 
punishment. First, the decision immediately affected hundreds of death row 
inmates who were either able to be exempted from execution altogether or 
were given new sentencing hearings. According to a Cornell Law School study, 
of the 3,700 inmates on death row,22 234, or about seven percent, had filed 
Atkins claims as of 2009.23 The success of defendants who have been able to 
prove their disability depends largely upon the specific procedures employed 
in each state. For example, the success rate of Atkins claims in North Carolina 
has been about 80 percent, while the success rate in Alabama has been 12 
percent.24 This discrepancy is due to the availability of funding for post-
conviction litigation and the different definitions of mental retardation, as 
well as other factors.25 As states refine their definitions of mental retardation 
and procedural restrictions, these factors will continue to have a significant 
impact on the implementation of Atkins.
Though the Atkins decision has been largely helpful thus far, the 
discrepancy between states’ different definitions of mental competency and 
their struggle to create clear-cut criteria has been the biggest roadblock to 
its implementation. The most relevant example of how the implementation 
of these criteria can be unclear ironically comes back to the case of Atkins 
himself. Although Atkins’ execution was ruled unconstitutional in the 2002 
Supreme Court decision, this was because, at the time, his test results clearly 
showed that he was “mildly mentally retarded” under the definition that was 
in place in the State of Virginia. In Virginia, the IQ threshold for a diagnosis 
of mental retardation was, and still is, a score of 70. When Atkins was tested in 
1998 he scored an IQ of 59, well below the threshold.26 However, the State of 
Virginia continued their prosecution of Atkins even after the Supreme Court’s 
decision, claiming that he was not truly mentally retarded. In fact, when 
Atkins was tested again in 2004, two years after the Supreme Court decision, 
defense experts discovered his IQ had jumped to 74, while prosecutors claimed 
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it was 76.27 Dr. Nelson, who tested Atkins in 1998 and 2004, attributed this 
jump to Atkins’ constant exposure to the lawyers that worked on his case and 
the “intellectual stimulation” that came with his long trial, which included 
“practicing his reading and writing skills, learning abstract legal concepts, and 
communicating with professionals.”28 
After these tests were made public, many called for the resentencing of 
Atkins and felt that the death penalty was now not only constitutional, 
but also necessary in his case. Doubts arose about the accuracy of both the 
1998 and 2004 tests, and many claimed that this was sufficient evidence 
that intellectual disability could be faked through the manipulation of IQ 
tests. However, some psychologists claimed that while it may be possible to 
deliberately score poorly on an IQ test, “it would be very difficult to feign 
low cognition across time, different settings and multiple examiners.”29 The 
prosecution argued that Atkins’ 1998 tests and diagnosis were tainted because 
his prior poor performance in school was due to drugs and alcohol, not to a 
mental deficiency.
The discrepancies in these tests raise important unanswered questions 
surrounding capital punishment. The Court’s decision to give the states 
discretion in formulating the criteria for implementation led to controversy 
over who should be responsible for deciding a criminal’s competency. Leading 
up to the mental competency trial, many of those familiar with the Atkins case 
also expressed concern over the objectivity of the jury that was responsible for 
determining Atkins’ mental state, as they were all informed of the full details 
of the murder. Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty Information Center 
claimed that this knowledge would “infect” the objectivity of the jury.30 
Referring back to the 2002 Atkins decision, Dieter argued that, “The Supreme 
Court ruled that we should not execute the mentally retarded, it did not say it 
should be a balancing act with the gruesomeness of the crime.”31
Following the trial, Atkins’ execution date was set once again, this time for 
December 2, 2005, due to his alleged newly acquired mental competency.32 
As the accuracy of this diagnosis continued to be questioned, Atkins’ execution 
was stayed once more. However, in 2008 Judge Prentis Smiley Jr. received 
notifications of allegations of substantial prosecutorial misconduct. After a 
two-day hearing regarding these allegations, Judge Smiley determined that 
these allegations were, in fact, credible and subsequently commuted Atkins’ 
sentence, replacing it with life imprisonment without possibility of parole, 
leaving the ultimate question of Atkins’ intellectual disability unanswered.33
In conclusion, although the question of whether to apply the death penalty 
to the intellectually disabled is still a complex and difficult one, it is clear that 
Atkins made a substantial leap in protecting this vulnerable group. Despite 
the ongoing discrepancies between state practices, there is no doubt that 
fewer intellectually handicapped criminals are being unjustly and pointlessly 
executed without serving any type of criminal justice function. However, the 
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Atkins decision and the strengthening of the Eighth Amendment through this 
line of cases, though celebrated by abolitionists, presents a type of “double-
edged sword.”34 If the goal for abolitionists continues to be a nationwide 
rejection of the death penalty, these types of cases may actually serve to 
stabilize it as an institution. If these cases continue to eliminate particular 
moral concerns about the application of the death penalty, abolitionists, 
through these victories, may simultaneously eliminate the elements of 
capital punishment most vulnerable to attack. As the Court continues to 
carve out these important categorical exemptions, it may also undermine 
“the power of abolitionists’ objections to capital punishment by exempting 
the most powerful ‘poster children’ of the abolitionist movement.”35 Given 
the conservative composition of the current Court and wide-spread popular 
support, it does seem that the death penalty is here to stay for the foreseeable 
future. For this reason, the Court’s categorical exemptions and strengthening 
of Eighth Amendment protection in order to make the institution more 
balanced and humane are a move in the right direction. 
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